

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING
Department of State

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SENT TO: Amembassy BONN PRIORITY 779

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Following for immediate delivery is letter from President to the Chancellor. Advise date and time delivery.

QUOTE October 9, 1959

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

As you know, when Mr. Khrushchev proposed at Camp David that a Summit meeting be held before I visit the Soviet Union in the spring I made it clear to him that I could not make any commitments regarding such a meeting because this was a question for consultation between the Western Allies.

Accordingly, I should very much like to learn your views on how I should reply to this proposal. I am also writing to ascertain the views of the British Prime Minister and the French President.

As I said in my last press conference it is my personal view that the Camp David talks remove many of the objections to a Summit conference. The appearance of threat and duress which had previously made it out of the question for us to meet jointly with the Soviet Chairman has in my opinion now been sufficiently altered. Although Mr. Khrushchev certainly did not modify any of the substantive positions of the Soviet Government regarding Berlin, German

Initiated by
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Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

S/S - John A. Calhoun

Character

The White House - Gen. Goodpaster

The Secretary (in draft)

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German reunification, disarmament or other major international questions during our talks, there was sufficient indication of a change of tone to justify further exploration. Indeed I believe we would be assuming a heavy responsibility if we now refused to meet him at the Summit.

I think that you will agree with me that if such a meeting is held we must clearly be united regarding the limits which our national interests place upon us. There is a possibility that we will find ourselves under severe pressure to accept proposals dangerous to our interests under the threat of a total breakdown of negotiations. This is a pressure under which we were placed at Geneva. I have no doubt about the West's ability to resist it. If it proves that no acceptable agreements can be worked out at the Summit I think we will be in a better position to win world support of Western positions than if we refused to meet at all.

We are also aware of the advantages which the Soviet Union would gain from duping the West into a false sense of euphoria and security. But I think we should be able satisfactorily to deal with this aspect of a Summit meeting. Judging from Mr. Khrushchev's behavior in the United States, the sedative role is not one which he can sustain without interruption for very long, and I consider that the over-all effect of his visit here has been to stimulate rather than lull our awareness of the Soviet challenge to the West.

If you agree that a Summit meeting could now be profitably held we must consider the complicated question of a timetable which will permit the preliminary interallied consultation clearly required.

There would

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There would be some advantage to a Summit meeting in December, which, if agreements in principle are reached, would make it possible to hold more detailed negotiations at the Foreign Minister or expert level before the spring. If a meeting is held in December it would have to precede the NATO Ministerial meeting scheduled for December 15, and therefore should probably commence near the beginning of the month.

I believe that we should meet with our British and French colleagues before a Summit meeting. I should be delighted to be the host to such a Western Summit meeting but would be prepared to come to Europe before a Summit meeting with the Soviets if that seems the most convenient arrangement for the others.

I await with the greatest interest your views on these questions, as well as on the possible locus for the Summit.

I have just received your letter of October 7, 1959 and am very glad to have your observations on the visit to this country of Mr. Khrushchev. We seem to be in substantial agreement in our evaluation of the situation.

I pray for your continued health and strength.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

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